2. There can be, and is, analogy among external relations, attributive, metaphorical or symbolic analogies, but such analogy is not metaphysical because the latter analogy is found only in the being of things and hence concerns only intrinsic relations.

The properly metaphysical dimension of Augustine's thought has received little special attention among scholars - even "Scholastics. " The Thomist metaphysicians - especially we "Anglo-Saxon" ones - receive first honors for being the most neglectful of all. Why? I t is a puzzling phenomenon particularly in the light of the fact (recognized by almost every Thomist) that the very existence of Thomas the theologian is inconceivable apart from his pre-eminent Christian mentor in the intellectual life, the Bishop of Hippo. It (...) is a puzzling phenomenon because, although the Christian metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas is not the Christian metaphysics of Augustine, these metaphysics could not be simply opposed to one another, else the theologies wherein they exercise the indispensable function of vital rational organs would themselves be discordant. But what respectable "Scholas tic" would deny that, in their essential teaching about God and the things of God, the thought of these two masters is remarkably congruent? May I suggest that one of the major reasons for this paradoxical neglect of Augustinian metaphysics on the part of Thomists (above all, in the English-speaking world) is their simplistic assumption that whereas Aquinas was an Aristotelian in phi losophy, Augustine was a Platonist, despite the fact that in theology they were substantially at one - as if there could be theological agreement, formally speaking, even where there is metaphysical disagreement, formally speaking. (shrink)

The latter quality can be cultivated by the metaphysician through considering the intimate link between signification and being. The impossibility of separating the two is highlighted by the fact that even "non-being" is significant as a sign of the simple negative judgment, x is not. For this sign assuredly is. And a "square circle," mathematically and physically nonexistent, has the "being" of an incompatible conjunction of signs severally significant.

In answering his primary question, What is existence?, Dom Mark draws an equation between "assertibility," "existence," "being," and "reality": "...this assertibility is precisely what we mean by existence or being or reality". And "assertibility," I take it, implies and is really identified with intelligibility; for all being is "assertible" just because and in so far as it is intelligible. So far, so good. The real difficulty is in Dom Mark's identification of "existence" and "being": "The existence of X, Y, and (...) Z simply is X, Y, and Z, but looked at as wholly dependent". And again: "...existence or being refers to every knowable object under that aspect which each has, of complete dependence on a source from which they are derived" p. 22). It is quite clear that in this doctrine existence is not the act of a dependent being, whereby that being is; "existence" is that very being considered as dependent. Dom Mark has firmly grasped and well explained the character of the created existent, as such, but at the same time he has identified the created existent with created existence--the creature, as such, with the creature's act of existence. (shrink)

A comprehensive review of Grenet's book would have to approach book-length itself, for "analogy" is discovered in all the Dialogues, and the Platonic principle and method of reasoning to which Grenet gives this name, and to which he attributes absolute universality, he treats extensively in heavily documented, text-packed treatises. His book in fact is divided into four "books." I shall therefore limit myself to two general questions: What does Grenet find to be the fundamental meaning of "philosophical analogy" in Plato? (...) Is this "analogy" philosophical, and if so, in what sense and with what value? (shrink)